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 Individualism, exceptionalism and counter culture in Second World War special 
service training. 
 
The popular literature of British special operations and special forces is extensive, 
sensational and hugely successful.1 Even in its less lurid manifestations, the genre is 
characterised by a focus on outstanding individuals and their extraordinary deeds of 
courage and daring. Given the nature of special operations and the forces that undertake 
them, this is not surprising in itself. It is also ideal writing material; the small scale of these 
operations presents a self-contained, manageable subject for a narrative wherein a small 
number of characters may be presented and developed for the reader’s understanding and 
entertainment. The stories are invariably of risk, high-stakes, tension and incident.  From 
them emerge the exceptional individuals, the mavericks, the heroes. They are often 
charismatic and unorthodox, and there is overt or implicit celebration of their non-
conformity as a virtue in itself. They succeed, or they fail heroically, as individuals. Such is 
the appeal of these accounts, and the consistent market for them, they have tended to 
crowd out more rigorous efforts to consider the historical and strategic context of special 
operations and special forces.  
 
And where a more analytical approach is intended, the temptation to dwell on exceptional 
individuals and remarkable operations remains.2 The present author might have been 
guilty as any of giving in to temptation at times in his 2007 account of Second World War 
special service training centres in the Scottish highlands.3 The geographic scope of th
work looked across the irregular warfare training centres run by different military 
organisations -  Military Intelligence, the Commandos and Combined Operations, Spe
Operations Executive and the American Office of Strategic Services, and found running 
through them a common thread of philosophy, practice and instructing personnel. 
Specifically, this first flowering of commando training could be traced back to one place and 
one time. Not, or at least not a first, to Achnacarry which later in the war made a reputatio
for toughness as the Commando Basic Training Centre, but to the requisitioned highlan
estate around Inverailort House, on the shores of Loch Ailort by the Road to the Isles, 
which in the early summer of 1940, became the first British irregular warfar
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This study documented the make-up of the original instructing team which improvis
training curriculum under the aegis of the short-lived 'Research' Branch of Military 
Intelligence. This first guerrilla warfare teaching staff was described, rather breathlessly, a
‘one of the most extraordinary combinations of talent and personality that the British war 
effort was to produce’.4 The special forces heroes were there alright, at the outset of their 
war careers – the Stirling brothers of Special Air Service (SAS) fame, Michael 'Mad Mike' 
 
1  The terminology developed in recent years distinguishing between ‘special forces’ and ‘special 
operations forces’ has not been applied for the purpose of this paper, anachronistic as it would be in the 
context of the Second World War and immediate post-war developments considered here.   
2  In commending a more strategic literature on the subject, Colin S. Gray allows that ‘The 
temptation to seek spectacular missions which could have strategically extraordinary consequences is 
well-nigh irresistible.’ James Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy. From World War II to the War on 
Terrorism, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), foreword by Colin S, Gray, xii. 
3 Stuart Allan, Commando Country (Edinburgh: NMS Enterprises Publishing, 2007). 
4 Stuart Allan, 2007, 37. 
Calvert, of the Chindits and the SAS, the celebrated Commando officer Lord Lovat, Freddy 
Spencer Chapman, he of 'the mad fortnight' and three years of guerrilla operations 
Japanese lines in Malaya for Special Operations Executive, and with them were a 
collection of distinguished polar explorers and mountaineers, unarmed combat specialists 
and demolitions experts as well as stalkers fro
behind 
m highland estates passing on their skills in 
e reading of country and stealth approach.  
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The unique environment of the highland sporting estate, as understood by the major 
Scottish landowners Stirling and Lovat who selected it as a suitable training environment, 
and some of the pre-existing cultural ideas associating that environment with masculinity, 
virility and character, influenced the training culture of the new special forces of Britain and 
its allies. It would be an exaggeration to claim that the training improvisations conducted in 
the heather and peat hags of the west highlands made an outstanding material contribu
to the course and outcome of the Second World War, or to argue that the origins of its 
training programmes made British and Allied special forces more or less successfu
themselves than they might otherwise have been. Nevertheless, the individuals at 
Inverailort, and the training methods they introduced, might be credited with a legacy 
stretching beyond the Second World War, one which c
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It is the habitual perspective of military museum specialists, concerned as we are with 
material culture over and above written sources, to think about military cultures a
we think about strategy, doctrine, tactics and operations. If one accepts, without 
necessarily entertaining determinist constructions about inherent national military 
tendencies, that culture has a meaningful influence over military institutions and how they
organise and fight, then the individualist culture of British special forces deserves some 
scrutiny beyond our acknowledging the merit and fascination of it.  Alastair Finlan is one 
historian who has given due weight to the cultural context of special forces developmen
internationally. He considers special forces to represent ‘a counter-cultural trend to the 
mainstream institutional culture of the armed forces from which they sprang.’ 5 In citing the 
British experience, Finlan focussed on David Stirling and the formation and development of 
the SAS in North Africa from 1941, acknowledging Stirling’s background in, and inheritance
from, earlier Commando formations. It may be that to understand this experience fully we 
also need to look back a little further in time and a little closer to home, to what David 
Stirling and others of a like mind were prototyping in the Scottish highlands a year earlier.
Because if early British special service training exhibited traits that were counter cultural 
responses to traditional British military thinking, and this paper will seek to demonstrate 
why they might be so considered, then these may be seen to have had an influence on th
development of competing cultures in relation to special forces during the Second World 
War and beyond.  Initial ideas about training might go some way to explaining the doubt
and opposition evinced towards special forces among more conventional military élites 
from the very beginning, and a
c
 
This opposition, running the gamut from scepticism through suspicion to hostility, was 
expressed through reasoned arguments that commando-type operations were a sidesh
 
5  Alastair Finlan, Special Forces, Strategy and the War on Terror. Warfare By Other Means, 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), 87-91. Finlan’s assessment of special forces culture is developed further 
in relation to the technology of special operations.  
that could not contribute meaningfully to the outcome of the war, and were therefore a 
distraction drawing resources away from the planning of large-scale military operations th
could. There was a concern that some of the best officers and men were being attrac
away from army units that needed them, and placed instead in the control of figures 
outside the conventional chain of command and responsibility. These arguments gaine
force beyond late 1941 when British strategy concentrated on building a conventional 
offensive capability, and the sceptics essentially won the day at the war’s end when the
Army Commandos, the SAS and Special Operations Executive were among the units 
derided as ‘private armies’ that were disbanded or reduced to cadre strength. 
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reactivation of the SAS to meet the requirements of the Malayan Emergency the existence 
and value of special forces became more generally accepted, but there remained at issue 
the matter of co-ordination and integration between special forces and conventional forces, 
and the qu
fo
 
Although Tim Jones has detected some activity on the part of the Secret Intelligence 
service and the War Office in preparing ‘stay-behind parties’ to operate in the events o
Soviet invasion, there is as yet no evidence that special operations were a significant 
element in British planning for major war in the Cold War context.8 That the subject was no
altogether ignored is represented by a guerrilla warfare study produced by the Min
Defence as a restricted publication in 1957.9 This compared recent experience in 
combating insurgents in Malaya with the record of Second World War insurgencies 
supported by the Allies, and was loosely directed towards application in conjectured forms
of a future war in Europe. However, as had been the case during the Second World War, 
active consideration of guerrilla operations remained on the fringes and was largely
the specialists and their individual champions in senior staff positions, and notable 
successes for the SAS in post-war minor conflicts, as in Oman and Borneo, did not 
automatically bring their strategic potential to the forefront. The higher public profile 
enjoyed by the SAS in particular from the early 1980s was however accompanied by a 
firmer placing for British special forces in the order of battle. It has recently been sugg
by commentators on both sides of the Atlantic that the nature of 21st century military 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has seen for the first time special forces fully integrated 
with and supported by conventional military forces at a strategic level.10 If this is true
been a long time coming, and might lead us too easily towards assumptio
 
6  Alanbrooke, Montgomery and Slim were among senior commanders who expressed the view 
that special operations capability should be developed inside and not outside conventional military 
structures.  Contributors to the debate in the immediate post-war years include those involved in the 
organisation and training of wartime special forces, e.g. Robert Laycock ‘Raids in the late war and their 
lessons’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, November 1947, 534-5; JP O’Brien Twohig, 
‘Are Commandos really necessary?’ Army Quarterly, 1948, 86-8. See also Brigadier TBL Churchill, ‘The 
value of Commandos’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, February 1950, 85-90; Colonel 
JW Hackett, ‘The employment of special forces’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institution, XCVII, 
1952, 26-41.   
7  Colin S. Gray, ‘Handful of heroes on desperate ventures: when do special operations 
succeed? Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly 29, Spring 1999, 2-24. 
8  T. Jones, ‘The British Army and counter-guerrilla warfare in transition, 1944-52’, Small Wars 
and Insurgencies, 7, 1996, 265-307; see also Colin McInnes, ‘The Gulf War, 1990-91’ in Hew Strachan 
(ed.) Big Wars and Small Wars. The British Army and the lessons of War in the 20th  Century,  
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2006) 166-7.   
9  Lt. Col. CNM Blair, Guerilla Warfare (London: Ministry of Defence, 1957).  The book was 
reprinted in 2005 by Naval and Military Press, Uckfield.   
10  Alastair Finlan, 2008, 139-162; Matthew Johnson, ‘The growing relevance of special 
operations forces in U.S. military strategy’, Comparative Strategy, 25(4), 2006, 273-96. 
conservatism on the part of traditional military élites in the post-war era.  
s not 
nd doctrine, but of culture, subculture and counter culture. As Colin Gray 
conten
operations can appear to those trained and socialised in regular military behaviour. 
to be 
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h
riginators impose these values through selection and training of group members.13  
 
 
 
 
Part of the explanation for this incongruity might, it is suggested, be found in the realm
of strategy a
ds,  
A detached observer or historian of special operations, particularly a civilian, 
generally will have difficulty grasping just how alien and even distasteful special 
11 
Military cultures, like the cultures of any human organisation, are organic, ambiguous and 
difficult to define. Accepting that the special operations environment is probably not a 
suitable one for embedded social anthropologists, one useful theoretical framework is 
found in the literature of organisational culture employed in the fields of management 
theory and work psychology.12 There are in this field nuanced interpretations and 
emphases on the nature of organisational cultures and the subcultures into which they 
differentiate, but they exhibit a shared acceptance that these cultures form and operate in 
meaningful ways in working groups of all kinds. Two essential, if rather obvious, elements 
garnered from the literature stand out here. The first is the abiding influence of individual 
founders/originators and the personal values and assumptions that they bring at the ou
to the cultures or subcultures of the organisations they create. The second is that t e 
o
 
Bearing this in mind, we return to Inverailort in the west highlands of Scotland in early June
1940. If not by any means the only source of early thinking about special forces and their 
training, this was certainly an early meeting of minds and an exemplar for what followed. 
There are no Commandos as yet, no Special Air Service, just some small operational 
teams and the Independent Companies raised hastily for the Norway campaign, both by 
Military Intelligence (Research).  One MI(R) operational team waiting in Scotland after the 
cancellation of a Norway operation is given leave to set up an experimental training school
and allowed the freedom to approach it in their own way. This occurs in the context of the
failure in Norway and rapidly unravelling campaign in France, defeats for regular forces 
alongside which nascent special operations teams were insufficiently prepared and 
organised to make an impact. Two of the moving figures are William (Bill) Stirling of Keir, 
and his cousin Lord Lovat, both major Scottish landowners with long-standing interests in 
the highland sporting estate. They are Regular Army Reserve captains only, former Scots 
Guards regulars whose political and social connections belie their military rank.14 They are 
typical of the officers that had been, and would continue to be, attracted to developing 
branches of special service, with international experience and contacts in the worlds of 
                                                 
11  Colin S Gray, Explorations in Strategy, (London: Praeger, 1998) 151. 
12  Organisational culture theory was first referenced in relation to special forces training in
Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: rebui
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lding U.S. special operations forces, (Washington D.C.: 
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A: 
 Joanne 
 and counterculture: an uneasy symbiosis’, 
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ions forces is referred to by Colin Gray 
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Bro s Institution, 1997).   
13  The classic definition of the culture of a group is given by Edgar Schein, Organisational 
Culture and Leadership, 3rd edition, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004). The theory of subcultures was 
further developed by Joanne Martin, Organisational Culture. Mapping the Terrain. (Thousand Oaks C
Sage, 2002). A case study of counterculture within a large business organisation is given by
Martin, and Caren Siehl, ‘Organizational culture
Org tional Dynamics, 12(2), 1983, 52-64. 
14  The importance of political patronage to special operat
and rs as a requirement for success. Colin S. Gray, 1999.  
commerce, imperial administration and sport.15  They, and their fellows, possess a strong 
streak of individuality, which in the case of Lord Lovat has already brought him into conflic
with his commanding officer in the uneasy relationship of regimental service in the Lovat 
Scouts, the regiment founded by his own father. They value non-conformity as a sign of 
strength and regard c
t 
onformity, that essential of military organisation and discipline, as a 
ause of stagnation. 
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As we have seen, in order to create an irregular warfare training course, essentially from 
scratch, the assistance that Stirling, Lovat and their associates brought to bear was not in
the main drawn from standard British military resources. Those brought to Inverailort as 
instructors, whether serving soldiers or civilians, had attributes that in military terms were 
unusually highly developed, such as in demolitions or marksmanship, or essentially extra-
curricular, as in polar exploration and mountaineering. Naval personnel were acquired
instruct soldiers in the handling of small boats. Skills in wireless communication were 
drawn from Royal Signals personnel previously working with MI(R) teams in Norway
These relatively conventional pursuits were supplemented by the more unorthodox 
disciplines of reflex shooting, knife-fighting and unarmed combat offered by the retired 
Shanghai Municipal policemen W.E. Fairbairn and Eric Sykes. And then there was highland
fieldcraft wing, the deerstalking disciplines that pervaded the Inverailort course. The senio
fieldcraft instructor was Lord Lovat, assisted by civilian stalkers employed on his family’s 
sporting estates, Spanish Civil War (Nationalist) veteran Peter Kemp, and Lieutenant Da
Stirling, younger of Keir. It would be hard to imagine something more removed from the 
parade gro
p
 
Clearly, the selection of instructing personnel and subjects they taught was directe
towards the practical requirements of irregular warfare in as much as these were 
envisaged at that early stage in the war. But there were cultural undercurrents also. The
individualism of such figures is, and was at the time, unmistakeable. The structures of 
conventional military service were not for them; indeed in certain cases they had taken 
determined steps to escape from its limitations. The job they had won for themselves was 
to take conventional soldiers and, in this new type of training environment, turn them into
something else, something more like them. There was a sense among such figures tha
the circumstances of defeat in Norway and France in 1940, and the national crisis this 
created, meant that a different approach was needed to combat an enemy of the characte
and capability of Nazi Germany, and that they we
f his methods of killing at close quarters, 
When it is a matter of life and death, not only of the individual but indeed of the 
nation, squeamish scruples are out of place. The sooner we realize that fact, the 
sooner we shall be fitted to face the grim and ruthless realities of total warfare.    
Implicit in this was the assumption that conventional military measures had already been
found wanting. There was a moral purpose in training of this kind, and a rejection of the 
perceived failures of the recent past. The products of the training were intended to becom
something exceptional to the run of normal soldiering. The instructors, with their unus
know-how, were defining themselve
tr
 
15  The background to MI(R) recruitment in discussed in Stuart Allan, 2007, 23-6. See also Ashley 
Jackson, ‘The imperial antecedents of British special forces’, RUSI Journal, 154 (3), 2009, 62-8.   
16  William Fairbairn,  All-In Fighting, (London: Faber and Faber, 1942), 8.   
 Organisational culture theory further expounds elements by which subcultures may be 
identified and through which they identify themselves. These elements include 'artefacts', a 
word of immediate interest to the material culture specialist. That all human groups employ
objects as symbols of membership and shared assumptions is understood and has been 
explored by sociologists and material culture theorists of many descriptions. But in the 
context of organisational subculture and counter culture these symbols emerge in contrast
or challenge to those of the mainstream. The definition of artefact in this context is broad
including such things as products, dress-codes, manners of address, shared rituals and 
stories.
 
 
, 
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which 
f 
le ge to 
the enemy, and indeed to those on the same side who did not carry such things.18 
17 For a single artefact defining the nascent subculture at Inverailort in 1940 one 
can readily identify the Fairbairn-Sykes fighting knife designed there by the two eponymou
members of the instructing staff based on their experiences with criminal gangs in 
Shanghai. This was a lethally elegant close-quarter killing weapon whose practical value 
was overlaid with a powerful emblematic quality. The ‘Commando knife’, as it came to be 
known in its subsequent mass production, was a weapon of the ruthless trained killer 
became, both in itself and through its adoption into the design of insignia worn by 
Commandos and others, a symbol of what was supposed to be different about those 
engaged in special operations.  An infantryman might use a bayonet to kill, and indeed the 
lore of bayonet fighting has its place in mainstream military culture, but the connotations o
knife-fighting and silent killing were something else altogether. The Fairbairn-Sykes knife 
was carried as a weapon suited for the work that might be at hand, though the extent to 
which it was actually used is open to question, and it was also flaunted as a chal n
 
Figure 1. Fairbairn-Sykes fighting knife, mark 1.  National Museums Scotland M.1990.298. 
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The definition of artefacts in organisational culture theory extends to encompass the 
differentiated working environment of each subculture. The Scottish highland setting of this
special service training initiative merits further consideration in such terms. The practical 
attractions were clear: challenging mountain terrain and weather for fieldcraft, fitness and 
endurance, water and shoreline for small boat work, remoteness and seclusion for security
 
17  Edgar Schein, 2004, 25-7; Joanne Martin 2002, 47. 
18  Paul Cornish has observed that the training methods of Fairbairn and Sykes in unarmed 
combat and knife fighting might have been more effective in instilling confidence over the prospect of 
such fighting than in inculcating practical techniques. Paul Cornish, ‘Weapons and equipment of Special 
Operations Executive’, in Mark Seaman (ed.), Special Operations Executive. A New Instrument of War, 
(London: Routledge, 2006), 22-31.  
substantial built property for accommodation. But it was also redolent with meaning in the 
values and assumptions of the originators, principally in this case Stirling and Lord Lo
who chose and requisitioned the specific locations.
vat 
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rough his intimacy with the responsibility and the visceral reality of the kill, attuned to the 
obility of nature and removed from the mundane scruples of the domesticated.20 
es 
had 
ere was 
 
ie’s respect. Prowess over highland ground was something 
at might be brought out in any man under expert instruction, provided his character and 
solve were of the right sort.  
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aramilitary schools run on Inverailort lines in nearby Morar, 
        
19 The association between prowess in
hunting and fitness for war is one with an ancient heritage in many cultures, but t
highland sporting estate has a cultural and political context of its own. Environmental and 
social historians have examined how the nineteenth and early twentieth century 
landowners, sporting tenants and their guests, who enjoyed near-exclusive access to this 
environment for recreational hunting, developed around it a set of self-regarding ideas
regarding their own prowess, character and masculinity. The initiated successful sportsman
was at once master of this challenging environment, more alive than other men, an
th
n
 
The class-based exclusivity of the highland sporting life was integral to this idealised genre, 
and the value of such a lifestyle as training for the leadership responsibilities of social élit
in British imperial endeavour and administration, and in warfare itself, was an idea that 
been expressed long before the outbreak of the Second World War.21 And yet th
room within this exclusive circle for the men who understood the sporting environment 
better than any other. Albeit fixed socially in the role of loyal native retainer, the 
professional estate workers, the deerstalker and the ghillie, were accorded respect and a 
lore of their own for their skill, physical capability and wisdom. The sporting gentleman had
to learn and be guided in his first steps by the real experts. If he was not a man of the 
requisite calibre he could be judged and found wanting.  But if he listened and learned he 
might earn the prize of the ghill
th
re
 
In addressing the necessity of killing by stealth, and in cold blood, the culture of the 
highland sporting life coalesced with the rather less refined know-how in close-quarter 
fighting contributed by Fairbairn and Sykes. Both entailed having blood on one’s hands. In
the former, the ‘gralloch’ or disembowelling of the deer was exalted as part of the ritual of 
the hunt, and indeed was included as a demonstration element of fieldcraft training in the 
early days at Inverailort. And if clinical marksmanship in deerstalking was the norm in the 
act of killing itself, a deadly encounter at closer quarters was also something to be lauded.
The extraordinary man who could bring down an unwounded stag by his own strength an
skill, and dispatch it with his own knife, was a legendary figure of Gaelic prowess extolled
in Victorian and Edwardian stalking literature.22 The same feat was attributed to Danish 
volunteer Anders Lassen, displayed to general admiration in January 1941 at one of the 
Special Operations Executive p
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nting, Conservation and the British Empire, (Manchester: 
nches 8). 
19  Stuart Allan, 2007, 35-7. 
20  Hayden Lorimer, ‘Guns, game and the grandee: the cultural politics of deer-stalking in th
Scottish highlands’, Ecumene, 7(4), 2000, 431-59; Andy Wightman. et al, ‘The cultural politics of 
hunting: sporting estates and recreational land use in the highland and islands of Scotland’ Sport in 
Society, 5 (1), 2002, 53-70; Katherine Grenier, Tourism a
Cal a, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 106-18. 
21  For an analysis of British hunting culture and its relationship to imperial power see John
MacKenzie, The Empire of Nature. Hu
Ma ter University Press, 198
22  Hayden Lorimer, 2000. 
and held up to epitomise the height of exceptional ability in the special service soldier.23    
  
At Inverailort, and the related establishments soon operating, it was not a great step from
such ideas to the elevation of training from practical preparation for specific kinds of military
task, to a test of the worth of the individual soldier, his fitness for the responsibility of 
special operations in every sense. The syllabus was incremental, ending in a multi-day 
endurance exercise or ‘scheme’ whereby the wisdom imparted over the weeks was tested 
overall. This was an extended initiation ritual.  All trainees started from scratch, officers 
to prove themselves exactly as other ranks and train alongside them. Even instructors 
invited in to reinforce the original team, such as Lieutenant David Stirling, had first to take 
and pass the Inverailort course before they could begin work. By means of the training 
course which they themselves had devised, the originators of special service training had 
designed an admission test. For those who made the grade in the eyes of their mentors, 
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e prize was admission into a new, self-defined military élite. For those who were seen to 
ave failed, the fate was rejection and return to the normal world of regimental soldiering 
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whence they had come. Such an approach necessarily challenged the value of the latter.  
 
ea of screened admission might help to explain one of the features of British specia
culture noted by Finlan in his description of the later formation of the SAS, 
the most striking element that makes them stand apart from traditional army 
formations is the unprecedented level of informality between officers and soldi
that simply would not work elsewhere...the genesis of these values goes back to 
Stirling's original idea that Special Forces should be essentially classless.24 
Placed against the class profiles of the originators of special forces, this might
something of a paradox, but as the earlier example of Inverailort might suggest, it was the 
patrician background of men like Stirling and Lovat that led them to see themselves outside
the confines and concerns of the mainstream culture and structure of military 
organisation.25 Uninterested in waiting for others to lead them in a wartime citizen’s army, 
peopled by men apparently less dynamic than themselves, they created a counter-cultural 
alternative which, in the highland setting in particular, was something fashioned on their 
own home ground. With these assumptions established from the outset, those admitted
magic circle of special operations could afford to be relaxed, indeed dis
c
O
training, they entered a different kind of relationship with their leaders. 
 
The freedom enjoyed in those first experimental months at Inverailort did not last long an
with the formation of the Army Commandos, this first training establishment and th
organisation of special service training as a whole was reined in by the War Office and the
new Combined Operations Directorate. The original instructors departed from what was 
now designated the Special Training Centre Lochailort in search of active service 
themselves, and the content of the Inverailort course was picked up by the newly-formed 
 
23  Mike Langley, Anders Lassen VC, MC of the SAS (London: New English Library, 1988), 47-8. 
24  Alastair Finlan, 2008, 95. 
25  Lovat and Stirling were cousins. The latter’s father had served as an officer in the Lovat 
Scouts, the specialist regiment raised by the Lord Lovat’s father from among stalkers, ghillies and 
keepers on highland sporting estates. See Michael Leslie Melville, The Story of the Lovat Scouts, 1900-
1980, (Edinburgh: St. Andrew Press, 1981).   
Special Operations Executive (SOE) for its own paramilitary training establishments locate
nearby. These went their own way in the n
d 
ew organisation dedicated to the support of 
sistance networks in enemy-occupied territory, forming one part of a three-step training 
rogramme for recruits. This ‘paramilitary’ training element, conducted in the Scottish 
ialised 
hrough 
t 
tandards of discipline or performance, they could be sent back from whence they 
ame, a sanction that came to be established as ‘Returned to Unit’ in Commando parlance. 
his practice dovetailed nicely with the Inverailort philosophy, and during 1940 and 1941 
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acarry was presented to the 
uccessful trainee at the end of his course, then and only then, as an honoured mark of his 
ew status as a Commando soldier. This remained the practice in Royal Marines 
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highlands, continued in the Inverailort mould until the European organisation of SOE was 
wound down towards the end of the war. 
 
The function of the Special Training Centre Lochailort meanwhile became more soc
into the mainstream and concerned itself principally with the training of Army Commandos. 
Its capacity was expanded and variations on the training syllabus refined to fit the new 
requirements. Officers and NCOs and selected groups from Commando units went t
the course as part of their overall training diet, and were expected to pass on their 
knowledge to their units as a whole. The Commandos had begun forming in the summer of 
1940, assembled from volunteers seconded from army units, chosen by interview. The fac
that officers and men had put themselves forward meant that, if they failed to meet 
required s
c
T
the Special Training Centre Lochailort stood at the highpoint of intensity in Commando 
training.  
 
From late 1941, with the war situation changing, and the Commandos unable to point to 
more than patchy success in small raiding operations, the Chiefs of Staff exerted greater
control over the organisation and resourcing of special service troops.  The Commandos 
were to be transformed into a larger force concerned less with stealth and raiding 
operations and directed instead towards deployment as amphibious assault troops w
in concert with the three services in large-scale combined operations. But the culture of 
exceptionalism survived the change. The Commandos continued to define themselves a
special, even as their role became a little less so. Conformity was re-asserted and 
individualism was controlled, but the essential idea of training and selection was not 
rejected. The existence of special training centres, and their location in a challenging 
‘wilderness’ environment, had become established in the system and embedded in the 
culture. Indeed, it was at the Commando Basic Training Centre at Achnacarry, or
requisitioned for use as a holding centre for Inverailort, that the culture of special training 
as an admission test to special service was institutionalised. Much of the Inverailort trainin
culture was adopted at Achnacarry, including the presence of professional deerstalkers on
the instructing staff but, in line with the new requirement for a greater number of 
Commandos to perform the assault troops role, the Achnacarry syllabus developed from 
the Inverailort model with greater attention to heightened performance in physical fitness 
and recognised infantry skills and with an emphasis on uniformity. Every Commando ha
to go to Achnacarry, and a would-be Commando could not become a Commando unless 
he passed the common standard of the Achnacarry course. This stipulation was re
with the use of another culturally powerful artefact, the green beret that had begun to
worn by No.1 Commando early in 1942, but which at Achn
s
n
Commando training post-war, first at Tywyn in Wales and latterly at the Commando 
Training Centre Royal Marines at Lympstone in Devon. 26 
 
26  Stuart Allan, 2007, 115. 
 The establishment of the commando function as that of amphibious assault infantry, and its 
continuation and development solely in the hands of in the Corps of Royal Marines, were 
among the immediate post-war outcomes of the struggle over the status and function of the 
special forces roles. As a long-established corps with its own distinct culture, the Royal 
Marines had been reconciled with the new special service culture of the Army Comman
from late 1941 with a degree of initial reluctance not least over the prospect of Royal 
Marines being trained at Achnacarry by Army instructors from outside the Corps. In movin
post-war commando training away from Achnacarry, which was restored to its owner in 
1945, ultimately to the south coast of England, this aspect of commando culture came 
more firmly into the traditional realm of the Royal Marines. The culture of the post-war 
Royal Marines Commandos might be seen as a hybrid of the two traditions, and its rigid
maintenance of training and selection as a screening process was one defining eleme
alongside its unique status as the soldiers of the Royal Navy, that kept the Corps disti
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Commando course, individualism relatively suppressed in favour of the promotion of 
teamwork and unit identity within a carefully codified Royal Marines and Commando 
ethos.27  
 
A similar process might be traced through the training culture of the Parachute Regiment
another new and unconventional unit, born of Second World War requirements, and much 
reduced from its wartime strength by 1948. As its original airborne role became 
obsolescent in strategic terms, the paratroopers were assimilated into a co-existence with 
British Army regimental culture.28 The improvised forms of early parachute training, as 
practised by No.2 Commando in 1940, had included a strong physical training element. 
From 1942 this was refined and formalised at the Airborne Forces Depot at Hardwick
Derbyshire as the pre-parachute training test required for a candidate to progress to
earning the coveted beret denoting special status, maroon rather than green in this specific
subcultural context.29 Post-war, this practice was enshrined in P (Pegasus) Company, one 
particularly challenging week in a two-phase basic training programme for would-be 
paratroopers. P Company remains a requirement for service today with Parachute 
Regiment battalions and also for other e
re
helicopter.  Again, screening by training and selection became the mark of the paratrooper
who was set apart from the conventional soldier by this rite of passage as much as by the 
original specialised operational role.30   
 
 
27  Anthony King, ‘The ethos of the Royal Marines: the precise application of will’. Independent 
report commissioned by the Commandant, Commando Training Centre Royal Marines, Lympstone. 
(Exeter: University of Exeter Department of Sociology and Philosophy, 2004). 
28  Hew Strachan, The Politics of the British Army, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 223-4. 
29 James Dunning, “It Had to Be Tough” The fascinating story of the origins of the Commandos 
and their special training in World War II (Durham: Pentland Press, 2000).  Among the parachute 
training pioneers of No. 2 Commando was Captain Martin Lindsay, polar explorer and member of the 
original instructing team at Inverailort.   Information about Hardwick Hall supplied by Airborne Assault, 
the Museum of the Parachute Regiment and Airborne Forces, Duxford, July 2010.    
30  A description of P-Company training in the early 1980s is given by Frank Hilton, The Paras, 
(London: BBC, 1983), 78-118. Colin Gray has commented on the culture of coloured berets to demote 
elite status as an aberration from the more flexible and unconventional outlook suited to special 
operations. Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 286-90. 
The 1945 disbandment of the Army Commandos and other wartime special service unit
was enacted in the context of reduced budgets and retrenchment. It nevertheless reflected 
a reassertion of mainstream military culture over these strange new entities that had 
seemed to be in competition with recognised structures of command and organisation for
roles, resources and status. That this apparent hiatus lasted only until the Malaya 
Emergency suggests with hindsight that something of real practical value had been 
dispensed with in the process. Indeed, within the War Office there were elements enga
in a stud
s 
 
ged 
y of the future potential of special operations before the end of 1945, and almost 
imultaneously with the formal disbandment of the SAS Regiment, SAS personnel were 
overtly deployed in support of counter-insurgency strategy in Greece.31 An SAS unit within 
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the Territorial Army was constituted in late 1946, suggesting recognition for the c
relevance of an organised specialism of this kind, even if only at the level of a reserve 
cadre.   
 
The overt operational revival of the SAS in Malaya in 1950 was initially a rather 
unsatisfactory reasserting of the special forces role. The Malayan Scouts was an SAS unit 
put together, at the request of senior commanders, by Brigadier Michael Calvert who 
stands out in the context of this paper as having been one of the original instructors at 
Inverailort ten years earlier. Calvert did not however have the opportunity to conduct a
training and selection process when assembling his original Scouts from personnel 
available to him in Malaya.32 Problems with indiscipline and organisation dogged their early
performance, and back in the United Kingdom in 1952 Major John Woodhouse drew on 
this salutary Malayan Scouts experience to start a rigorous training and selection scheme 
in Snowdonia for SAS Territorial Army volunteers. Moved subsequently to the Brecon 
Beacons, this course has endured since as a permanent feature of SAS recruit
33nal element in SAS culture.  Alongside this structured exceptionalism, the heritage
idualism remained as part of the culture at least, if subdued somewhat over time by 
 rigorous concept of SAS professionalism than existed in the mind of the regiment’s 
r. Perhaps aware of this subtle shift in emphasis, in 1985 Colonel Sir David Stirling 
f the importance of ‘amateur soldiers’ to the qualities of the Regiment,  
from this danger; it is constantly experimenting with innovative techniques, many 
which stem from its Territorial regiments, drawn as they are from every w
civilian life.34 
 
Nevertheless, the post-war military subcultures descending from wartime special forces 
have tended to stress their exceptionalism whilst containing and controlling the 
individualism dear to their progenitors. This has been to good purpose in maintaining the 
quality of the units concerned. It has however raised some interesting issues around 
operation between special forces derived ‘élite’ units and those who must work with them. 
The post-war role assigned to the Royal Marines Commandos necessitated their workin
in full integration with supporting forces within 3 Commando Brigade. One consequent 
 
31  Tim Jones, Post-war Counterinsurgency and the SAS, 1945-52. A Special Type of Warfare. 
(London: Frank Cass, 2001), 14-18. 
32  David Rooney, Mad Mike. A Life of Michael Calvert, (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1997). 136-41. 
33 Michael Asher, The Regiment. The Real Story of the SAS (London: Viking, 2007), 328-9. See 
also John Newsinger, Dangerous Men. The SAS and Popular Culture. (London: Pluto Press, 1997), 16.  
34  William Seymour, British Special Forces. The Story of Britain’s Undercover Soldiers, 2nd ed. 
(London: Pen & Sword Military Classics, 2006). Foreword by Sir David Stirling.  
development was the ‘All-Arms Commando Course’ run at the Commando Trainin
Royal Marines, so that those serving with 3 Commando Brigade artillery, engineers, 
logistics and indeed infantry units could be put through a version of the Commando-train
test before being passed to serve with the Brigade. Th
g Centre 
ing 
is is a situation that continues to 
enerate debate among those affected, among the most recent being an exchange in the 
ritish Army Review over the relevance of the All-Arms Commando course to the 
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operational environment in Afghanistan. While such issues are discussed around the 
practicalities, the debate cannot be conducted without some reference to ‘ethos’, to the 
tensions between competing cultures therefore.35      
 
For special forces in the purer sense, from the end of the Cold War in particular British 
army doctrine and structure has been adapted to enhance integration between special an
conventional units. The organisational status and influence of the former was enhanced in
1987 with the creation of the United Kingdom Special Forces Directorate and the relevan
and influence of special forces have since grown markedly in the operating enviro
the Gulf War, Iraq and Afghanistan. It has been suggested that for a conflict with the heavy 
demands and duration of the intervention in Afghanistan, UK Special Forces may simply 
not be big enough and that a lack of trained personnel might quickly become an issue in 
any greater conflict.36  High failure rates among those seeking to join special forces an
other élite units are an inescapable fact of the selection process; they are indeed 
necessary to the cultural assumptions upon which the process is based. One response to 
the heightened requirement for special operations was the 2006 creation of the Special 
Forces Support Group, whereby elements and individuals from the Parachute Regiment,
the Royal Marines Commandos and others received further training for roles in dire
support of the special forces units themselves. In strategic and tactical terms this 
development suggests a drive for flexibility; in cultural terms it reinforced the position of th
training and selection culture. The earlier passing of one of the established tests, either
commando or pre-parachute training, was 
in
C
acquired an additional role closer to that practised by their ancestors of 1940-41, but 
British military organisation as a whole, for good or ill, there remained a cultural divide 
between special and conventional forces. 
 
Those who argued against the commando concept during and immediately after the 
Second World War were reacting against something that had grown up outside their co
and which, as the nature of the culture at Inverailort suggests, was a culture first conce
in challenge to established military thinking and organisation. Curiously, from late 1941, in
seeking to wrest control from the individualists and render new ways of war palatable to 
mainstream culture, more conventional military thinking seized on and institutionalised th
new approaches to training, the very thing that would give enduring life to the counter-
cultural tendencies. The rigid relationship between training and élite status stays with
British armed forces to this day, and may also be found in the military cultures of nati
which emulated British practice in this area, notably in the United States where first the 
Army Commandos and later the SAS were taken as the models for the developmen
 
35 Major Jon Creswell, ‘United we conquer – the Commando course of the future’, British Army 
Review, 146, Spring 2009, 92-3; Lt. Col. Richard Smith, ‘The All Arms Commando Course – meeting the 
operational requirement’, British Army Review, 147, Summer 2009, 83-6. 
36 Alastair Finlan, ‘The (arrested) development of UK special forces and the global war on terror’, 
Review of International Studies, 25, 2009, 971-82.  
similar capabilities. The founders of the first special training centre did not themselves
necessarily foresee that their metho
 
ds would, or should, lead to the units they were 
eparing becoming permanent fixtures on the British establishment. If, since 1940, 
scriminatory cultures based on training and selection have not always contributed to 
ooperation and integration in strategy and tactics, this may be because they were 
onceived in the first place as a gateway into a new kind of élite, one that was never 
tended to be part of the system.   
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